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ABSTRACT 
Since the 1970s Britain has gone from being a country of net emigration to one of net 
immigration, with a trend increase in immigration of more than 100,000 per year. This 
paper represents the first attempt to model the variations in net migration for British and 
for foreign citizens, across countries and over time. A simple economic model, which 
includes the selection effects of differing income distributions at home and abroad, 
largely accounts for the variations in the data. The results suggest that, while improved 
economic performance in the UK relative to overseas has tended to increase immigration, 
rising UK inequality has had an even larger effect. Immigration policies at home and 
abroad have also increased net immigration, particularly in the 1990s. 
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1. Introduction  
In the last 20 years the United Kingdom has become a country of net immigration. During 
the 1960s and 1970s emigration exceeded immigration so that net immigration was 
persistently negative. Since then net immigration has progressively increased. The best 
available measure of long term trends indicates an increase in the annual net immigration 
from -24 thousand in the early 1970s to 89 thousand in the late 1990s, a total increase of 
113 thousand. Recent trends are even more dramatic. From the trough in 1991-3 to the 
peak of 1998-2000 net immigration surged by more than 100 thousand per annum.  
So why has UK net immigration increased so dramatically? On one view it is 
simply the result of immigration policies at home and abroad and is therefore chosen by 
policymakers. But evidence for other countries shows that a good deal of the variation in 
immigration can be explained by economic forces.1 This issue is particularly important 
since the UK government has embarked on a series of reforms to immigration policy, the 
most recent of which is the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002. These 
policies have been implemented in the absence of any quantitative research on the 
determinants of immigration to the UK.2 Consequently, assessments of the effects of 
policy, as distinct from economic forces, on the size and composition of the net and gross 
flows have been lacking. 
This paper is the first to provide a set of econometric estimates explaining 
migration flows between Britain and the relevant source or destination countries.  The 
flows are explained in part by the usual economic variables such as business cycles and 
                                                          
1  Recent studies include Cobb-Clark and Connolly (1997) for Australia, Clark et. al. (2002) for the 
United States, Karemera et. al. (2000) for the United States and Canada, and Karras and Chiswick (1999) 
for Germany. Other studies are summarised by Bauer and Zimmermann (1999).  
2  A survey of UK immigration by Glover et. al. (2001) published by the Home Office contains some 
assessment of the factors behind recent trends in immigration as background to the 2002 Act and the 
government White Paper that preceded it. However it does not cite any quantitative studies and it only 
provides evidence of a negative relationship between net immigration and UK unemployment since 1984. 
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per capita incomes at home and abroad. But a key new finding is that changing income 
distribution also matters, and that growing inequality in Britain accounts for a significant 
share of the recent rise in net immigration. Shifts in policy must also be taken into 
account and these seem to have been important, particularly in the late 1990s.  
 The following section outlines the trends and composition of migration to and 
from Britain. This is followed by a summary of immigration policies at home and abroad 
and then by a discussion of incentives and selectivity in the decision to migrate. This 
highlights the effects on the flows of migrants of relative income, of earnings inequality 
and of policy. The subsequent sections report random effects panel estimates, using data 
on net and gross immigration from the International Passenger Survey. The data cover 13 
source/destination areas over 25 years and are analysed for British citizens and for foreign 
citizens. The results support the view that relative income, inequality and policy all play a 
part in determining these flows.  
 Finally, an attempt is made to decompose the influences that account for trends in 
total net immigration, both in the long-run and in the short-run. This indicates that trends 
in unemployment and relative income have contributed only modestly to the increase in 
net immigration. More important are the effects of the long term increase in UK 
inequality and the shifts in European and British policy during the 1990s. The paper 
concludes with some speculations about prospective future trends in UK immigration. 
 
2. Trends in UK international migration  
The only comprehensive statistics on international migration for Britain come from the 
International Passenger Survey (IPS), which has been taken in its present form since 
1964. It is derived from a sample of travellers to and from the United Kingdom surveyed 
at airports, seaports and the channel tunnel. Migrants are defined in the IPS as those who 
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are entering (or leaving) for an intended period of at least a year, after at least a year 
abroad (or in Britain). Trends in the IPS net immigration figures can be seen in Figure 1. 
The long-term increase in net immigration displays short run fluctuations around a clear 
upward trend. From the early 1980s the historic pattern of net emigration turns into net 
immigration, increasing sharply from the mid-1990s. 
 As is widely acknowledged, the published IPS data, which are grossed up from a 
stratified sample, are subject to certain biases. They exclude movements to and from the 
Irish Republic (under the common travel area), and they exclude a significant proportion 
of asylum seekers and 'visitor switchers'--those who enter as short-term migrants and 
either change their status or overstay. The Office for National Statistics adjusts the overall 
net immigration balance to take account of this. Adjusted net immigration (the dotted 
line) exceeds the IPS figure by about 40 thousand per year between 1985 and 2000. But 
recently, in the light of the 2001 census results, it has been suggested that there are also 
significant upward biases--amounting to about 50 thousand per year in the 1990s. In this 
light, the unadjusted IPS figures used in what follows are more appropriate for assessing 
immigration trends rather than absolute levels.3  
 Figure 2 shows (unadjusted) net immigration divided between British citizens and 
foreign citizens. Most of the increase in net immigration before the 1980s was due to the 
declining net emigration of British citizens. Since then the trend has been relatively flat. 
By contrast, net immigration of foreign citizens drifted downwards very slightly until the 
early 1990s, after which there was a sharp increase. The IPS data also divides the flows of 
migrants by country, or region, of next or last residence.4 Table 1 shows the direction of 
                                                          
3  Adjusted figures are only available at the aggregate level since the mid-1980s and they are 
available at a more disaggregated level only since 1999. In order to maintain comparability over time and 
across different sources/destination regions there is no alternative but to use the unadjusted figures.  
4  These categories are not ideal but they are the lowest level of aggregation available in the 
published statistics.  
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net immigration over recent decades for British and foreign citizens combined. The 
decline in net emigration to ‘Old Commonwealth’ countries reflects, in part, the long-
term decline in emigration of British citizens shown in Figure 2. For Australia and 
Canada, net emigration since the 1970s has decreased dramatically, while for New 
Zealand and South Africa it has become net immigration.  
 It is notable that there has been no upward trend in net immigration from the New 
Commonwealth, either from the Indian subcontinent, from Africa, or from the Caribbean. 
Among non-Commonwealth countries there has been a strong upward trend in net 
immigration from Europe, particularly the European Union. But there is little evidence of 
increases in net immigration from elsewhere. Overall, the rise in net immigration has 
come from the relatively developed OECD countries, rather than from the third world. 
Roughly the same applies to the surge from 1993 to 1998, some 85 percent of which is 
accounted for by the Old Commonwealth, Europe and the United States. 
 Net immigration represents the difference between much larger gross flows in 
both directions. As Table 2 shows, in the 1990s the net immigration balance was about 
one fifth of gross immigration, and in the 1970s net emigration was less than a fifth of 
gross emigration. The overall change in the balance was driven partly by a decline in 
gross emigration of British citizens and, more notably, by a rise in gross immigration of 
foreign citizens. The substantial gross immigration of British citizens, and gross 
emigration of foreign citizens, reflect the fact that many migrants are relatively short-term 
stayers. In the decade 1991-2000, 36 percent of immigrants and 28 percent of emigrants 
were intending to stay for less than three years or more, while 39 percent of immigrants 
and 55 percent of emigrants intended to stay for more than four years (Table 4). 
  It seems likely that these flows, particularly among those who were returning (and 
who would not face immigration controls), will be sensitive to economic conditions.  But 
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not all migrants are workers; many come (or leave) as part of the family of a worker or 
for other reasons such as education. The IPS records the age, sex and economic status of 
immigrants and emigrants. Table 3 shows the net balance of these various categories over 
recent decades. Net immigration of females tends to exceed that of males and the overall 
growth in net immigration is largely due to an increase in the 15-24 age range and fall in 
net emigration among those aged 25-44. Among adults (those aged 15 and over) there is 
substantial net immigration of those described as students and significant increase in non-
occupied adults. The non-worker categories, including the under 15's, represented 47 
percent of the gross inflow and 43 percent of the gross outflow in the decade 1991-2000. 
Of course many of them would subsequently become workers, a point that is reflected 
especially by the persistent net immigration of students.5  
 The IPS records the occupations of immigrants and emigrants, but these are 
presented only in two broad categories: professional or managerial and manual or clerical. 
Over the last three decades, net emigration turned into net immigration in both categories 
and in the 1990s the net immigration of ‘skilled’ workers was more than double the net 
inflow of ‘unskilled’ (Table 3). But changes in the net balance hide the fact that both 
immigration and emigration have become more skilled. As Figure 3 shows, the 
percentage of professional and managerial among worker immigrants rose from 40 
percent in 1971 to 72 percent in 2000, and their share among emigrants (the dotted line) 
rose by a similar amount. This change in the skill structure is an important characteristic 
of the overall trend in migration. It seems likely that this was due to three things. First, 
there is the general rise in skills among the workforce at home and abroad. Second there 
has been  increasing skill selectivity of immigration policies in countries receiving British 
                                                          
5  Some of those who arrived as students would have joined the UK labour force on the completion 
of their studies. But it also seems likely that some of those who returned would have given their future or 
intended occupations, rather than describing themselves as students.  
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immigrants, which have reduced the opportunities for unskilled British workers to 
emigrate. And third, mildly skill-selective policies in Britain have been combined with 
increasing incentives for skilled immigrants, as reflected in the widening income 
distribution. 
   
3. Immigration policies in the UK and abroad  
 Since, in the econometric analysis, account is taken of policy, we now turn to a 
brief summary of relevant immigration policies. British immigration policy is governed 
by the Immigration Act of 1971, and subsequent modifications to it. Immigration control 
is administered by the Home Office Immigration and Nationality Department, although 
work permits were, until recently, issued by Overseas Labour Service of the Department 
for Education and Employment.6 Irish citizens and nationals of European Economic Area 
countries are essentially free to live and work in Britain. Commonwealth citizens with 
right of abode, those who have British passports, and those who have acquired finite or 
indefinite leave to enter or remain also have the right of free entry.7 
 Those not otherwise entitled to work in Britain are required to have a work permit, 
applied for by a prospective employer. The number of work permits is not subject to an 
overall quota but permits are issued according to the level of qualification or for specific 
occupations in demand. Work permits are granted initially for four years but with the 
possibility of renewal for a fixed term or the granting of indefinite right to remain. The 
right to work is also available on a short- term basis to groups such as business people, 
journalists, diplomats, sports people and entertainers. Short-term work permits are also 
issued under a variety of schemes for working holiday-makers, agricultural workers, au 
pairs, teachers and those entering under the Training and Work Experience Scheme.  
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 The work permit system has been subject to minor modifications since the 1970s, 
with major revisions in 2000 and 2002.8 The number of work permits issued fell from 75 
thousand in 1969 to a low of 15 thousand in 1982, rising again to 80 thousand in 1999. 
The sharp rise in the number of work permits issued in the late 1990s is indicative of a 
significant relaxation of policy adopted by the Labour administration from 1997 onwards, 
including an increased allocation of work permits and relaxation of controls on non-
economic immigration. Under the 2002 Act, the government introduced a further 
expansion of immigration routes, including a new programme based on a points system to 
attract highly skilled immigrants.  
 Migrants under the work permit system may obtain indefinite leave to remain or 
be accepted for settlement, and may eventually qualify for UK citizenship. Spouses and 
children of primary immigrants can also acquire the right to settle and work in Britain, 
subject to certain criteria. In some circumstances, the right to family reunification is 
extended to parents and grandparents and to fiancé(e)s. In 1998, 20 thousand entered as 
dependants of work-permit holders and another 50 thousand under the family 
reunification scheme.  
The other main groups of migrants to the UK are students and refugees. Students 
(not otherwise qualified for entry) are admitted if accepted for a course at a recognised 
educational institution, but without the right to work and only for the duration of the 
course. Britain's policy towards asylum seekers (not directly considered here) is based on 
its obligation under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol. About one third 
of asylum claims are accepted, either as Convention refugees or under the discretionary 
category of ‘exceptional leave to remain’.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
6  Now renamed Work Permits UK and transferred to the Home Office.  
7  Current regulations can be found at: http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/. 
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Among the main destination countries for British immigrants there have been 
significant shifts in immigration policy since the 1960s. These include the abolition of 
preferences for immigrants from Britain and Europe, variations in total immigrant quotas, 
and the increasing use of selection by labour market characteristics, especially education 
and skills.9 
 In Canada the preference given to immigrants from the UK, France, the US and 
certain Commonwealth countries was abolished in 1962 and replaced with a system based 
on four different categories: sponsored dependants, nominated relatives, refugees and 
asylum seekers, and independent migrants. The admission of assisted relatives and 
independent migrants is based on selection through the points system first established in 
1967. In Canada, in addition to having relatives, points are awarded for age, education, 
occupation, having pre-arranged employment, and fluency in English or French. This 
basic system was modified by the Immigration Acts of 1976, 1988 and 1993. 
Administratively-set targets for total admissions were sharply reduced in 1982-6 and then 
raised to over 200 thousand in the 1990s. As a result the share admitted under the points 
system was reduced in the 1980s but increased again in the 1990s (Green and Green, 
1995, 1999). Modifications to the points system further increased the skill selectivity of 
immigration policy in the 1990s. By 1994, nearly half of all immigrants were admitted 
principally on labour market characteristics. 
 From 1973 Australia abandoned so-called “white Australia” policy, which gave 
preference chiefly to immigrants from Britain and Ireland, in favour of a 
nondiscriminatory system similar to that of Canada. The targets for admission were also 
reduced during the 1970s and expanded subsequently, but have varied from year to year 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8  On the system up to the late 1980s, see Salt and Kitching (1990); arrangements until the most 
recent changes are summarised in Glover et. al. (2001).  
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depending on labour market conditions. The points system - adopted originally in 1979 
and radically revised in 1983 - is applied to independent migrants, business migrants, 
those nominated by employers and those sponsored by relatives. The criteria put weight 
on occupations in demand, education and experience. Over time, skill selectivity has 
increased and in the 1990s more than a third of migrants were selected on economic 
criteria.  
In New Zealand, similar policies have been followed since the weakening in 1974, 
and abolition in 1987, of preferences for British and European immigrants. The points 
system adopted in 1991 stresses qualifications, age, experience, language skills and 
sponsored relatives. But, as compared with Australia, the New Zealand system has gone 
further in giving weight to general skills rather than to occupations in demand 
(Winkleman, 1999). In the 1990s, 65 percent of immigrants to New Zealand were points-
tested. Both Australia and New Zealand operate a variable point score for admission that 
depends on labour market conditions.  
 In the United States, the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality 
Act abandoned country quotas favouring western Europe, replacing this with an 
aggregate quota for the eastern hemisphere as a whole. Under the post-1965 system the 
overwhelming majority of visas were reserved for family reunification migrants, 
including non-immediate relatives. The 1990 Immigration Act expanded the number of 
employment-based visas from 54,000 to 140,000; nearly all of which were designated for 
skilled workers, and the total quota was increased by about 40 percent. But US 
immigration policy remains less skill-selective than that of the other traditional countries 
of immigration. Under the system in operation since 1992 more than 70 percent of visas 
are still reserved for family members.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
9  Summaries of immigration policies in the major receiving countries can be found in Stalker 
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  Like Britain, most of the countries receiving British immigrants operate 
programmes for temporary migration, often for the high-skilled or for occupations in 
demand. In Australia, employer-nominated skilled workers are admitted for two years 
(renewable once), and in Canada for three years (renewable). In the United States, the 
provision for admitting high skilled workers with H-1B visas for periods of up to three 
years (renewable once) was expanded under the 1990 Immigration Act. In all three 
countries and New Zealand, fixed period visas are also issued under various schemes for 
study and work experience, for working holidays and for business personnel or those 
moving within the same firm.  
 Among other countries immigration policies vary too widely to discuss in detail. 
Most countries operate a system of work permits or passes, generally for restricted 
periods of time and sometimes subject to quotas. Often, immigrants require sponsorship 
from an employer or family member and the right to remain or to become a citizen is 
strictly circumscribed. In some cases, rules for immigrants differ by source country or 
ethnicity. In some countries, such as Japan, and in other parts of Asia, immigration 
controls are  relatively tight whereas in other cases such as in South America they are less 
restrictive.  
 
4. Migration and selection 
The effects of economic incentives on migration have been much studied, notably by 
Sjaastad (1962), Borjas (1987) and Chiswick (2000). The basic framework laid out by 
Borjas has been widely used to analyse the average "quality" of the immigrant flow, but it 
has less often been applied to the quantity of immigration or emigration. Here I use a 
variation of this framework to examine the effects of relative incomes, income inequality, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1994), UN (1998) and OECD (1998). On international migration law, see Plender (1987). 
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and immigration policy on the numbers of migrants or, more specifically, on the 
probability that individuals will migrate from one country to another.  
 In the source country, y, skill endowments follow a normal distribution: s ∼ N (µs, 
σs2). The incomes that individual i (i = 1, …, n) receives at home in country y, and would 
receive if he/she were to migrate to country x, are: 
Income in destination: wxi = αx + βxsi, distributed as wx ~  N (µx, σx2)   
          (1) 
Income in origin: wyi = αy + βysi; distributed as wy ~ N (µy, σy2) 
 
Here αx, βx, αy and βy are parameters of the respective earnings functions. The greater is 
β, the greater the return on skills and the more unequal is the country’s income 
distribution. Thus income levels, and income inequality, differ in origin and destination 
but incomes in x are perfectly correlated with those in y across individuals in the origin 
country.  
 The costs of migration (including psychic costs) include three elements. 
Individual preferences for migration, in terms of equivalent income, zi, follow a normal 
distribution, z ∼ N(µz, σz2), where z is independent of s (Cov (s,z) = 0). zi is interpreted as 
an individual-specific cost or compensating differential and hence µz is assumed to be 
positive. This ensures that not everyone migrates in response to an income differential 
favouring the destination country. Factors such as having relatives in the destination 
country could be interpreted as lowering the costs of emigration by reducing the value of 
zi. There is also a direct cost, c. This is the same for all migrants and may also reflect 
immigration policy: tougher immigration policy raises the cost of migration for all 
immigrants by increasing c. 
 The probability that an individual, i, will migrate from country y to x, mi, is: 
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mi = Prob (wxi − wyi − zi − c  > 0) , or 
           (2) 
mi = Prob (v > 0), where v = wxi − wyi − zi − c  
 
Summing over all n individuals in source country y, the emigration rate to x is:  



 +++−Φ−=
v
zyx cM σ
µµµ
1         (3) 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. Higher mean income in the 
destination or lower income in the source country increases the migration rate, as does a 
fall in the mean of  personal migration costs such as might be associated with a larger 
expatriate community.  
 The standard deviation of v, can be written as: 
yxzyxv σσσσσσ 2222 −++=        (4) 
 
The effects of changes in income distribution depend on the sign of the numerator in the 
bracketed term in (3) as well as on the sign of the derivative of σv with respect to σx and 
σy. If the destination country has sufficiently high relative income adjusted for migration 
costs (µx > µy + µz + c), and it is more equal (σx < σy) then an increase in destination 
inequality will increase immigration. Thus increasing inequality in Britain would tend to 
attract (relatively skilled) migrants from countries that were sufficiently poor and 
unequal. By contrast if income in Britain (adjusted for immigration costs) is sufficiently 
low relative to, say, OECD countries, then increasing inequality will increase migration 
from these provided that British inequality is greater. If neither of these cases hold then 
growing inequality will deter immigration. The effects for origin countries are exactly the 
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opposite. Thus increasing inequality in poor and unequal origin countries will tend to 
stem emigration if they are sufficiently unequal initially. 
  
5. Data 
The data on migration to and from Britain are from the International Passenger Survey, 
for which summary statistics were presented earlier. The survey covers about 0.2 percent 
of all travellers, only a fraction of whom are migrants. Although the data are subject to 
sampling error, non-response rates are relatively low.10 Biases are most likely to arise 
because stated intentions may differ from actual behaviour (as in the case of asylum 
seekers or visa switchers) or because plans change. The survey results, grossed up using a 
complex weighting system, are published only for the source destination countries listed 
in Table 1 above. Thus it is not possible to further disaggregate the country groups. 
Because of changes in the countries included in country groups, EU and non-EU Europe 
were merged.11 This gives thirteen country or country groups over the period from 1976 
to 2000--a total of 325 country-year observations. These are for all migrants. While they 
can be divided between British and foreign citizens, they cannot be disaggregated by age 
or labour market status.  
 Series for real income per capita were obtained from the World Bank Global 
Development Network database.12 These are an updated version of the Penn World 
Tables 5 and they are adjusted to purchasing power parities of 1985. Income data for the 
country groups represented in the IPS statistics were obtained by taking weighted 
                                                          
10  The 95 percent confidence interval for gross immigration is about 5 percent. Clearly, it will be 
larger for net immigration and for migration to and from specific destinations. But if immigration is the left-
hand side variable then sampling error will fall into the equation error term.  
11  The Middle East is separately distinguished but only from the 1980s and so this is subsumed in 
Other Foreign.  
12  Income and population data were obtained from the website: 
http://www.worldbank,org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm.  
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averages using (variable) population weights. Excluding the single countries and the 
aggregate of Bangladesh/India/Sri Lanka, the remaining six country groups are 
represented by 107 individual countries. However, China, the former Soviet Union, the 
former Yugoslavia and Ireland are excluded. A consistent annual series for the gini 
coefficient of equivalised household, post-tax incomes in the UK was provided by the 
Institute of Fiscal Studies.13 Foreign income inequality was calculated from World Bank 
data, assembled by Deininger and Squire and augmented by the WIDER Institute.14 The 
series used are those designated as "high quality" and are linearly interpolated between 
benchmark years as appropriate. The six multiple country groups represent a total of 82 
countries and they are each aggregated using current population.  
 To capture the effects of expatriate communities in Britain we use the stock of 
foreign-born living in Britain in 1981 for each of the source countries or aggregates.15 For 
the British living abroad we have similar figures for 1971, but only for the USA, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. For the other country groups, where 
the numbers of British-born are likely to be small, the value was set to zero. 
Unemployment rates, which often feature in migration models, could only be obtained on 
a consistent basis for OECD countries. Since overseas unemployment rates did not turn 
out to be empirically important, only the UK unemployment rate is used. Other variables -  
including relative education levels and UK real house prices - also proved to be 
statistically insignificant in the regressions and are omitted in the results presented below. 
 
                                                          
13  I am grateful to Andrew Shephard who kindly made this series available to me. Further details and 
an analysis of trends in income equality (for 1979-97) are given in Clark and Taylor (1999). Steve Machin 
kindly provided an alternative series for UK wage inequality. This series gives similar results to those using 
income inequality and so only the latter are reported in the following sections.  
14  These data are available at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. Certain adjustments were 
made according to whether the observations were for income/expenditure, gross/net income or  
individuals/households. 
15  These data are reported in ONS International Migration, 198?. 
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6. Immigration of foreign citizens 
Random effects (RE) panel estimates of the determinants of immigration for the thirteen 
source areas by 25 years appear in Table 5. Random effects estimation exploits the cross-
sectional variation in the data, as well as the time series variation, and these estimates are 
not rejected against the alternative of fixed effects. Overall the RE estimates explain 46 
percent of the variation for net immigration and two thirds of the variation for gross 
immigration. In light of the relatively high gross flows, the emphasis here is chiefly on 
net immigration.  
 Now consider the explanatory variables. Note that the variable for the foreign 
born stock in 1981 has no time series variation and the European dummies are specific to 
flows to and from Europe. The UK unemployment rate is entered as a change (the current 
or lagged level was never statistically significant) and it has a negative effect as expected. 
Thus a one percentage point increase in unemployment over the previous year reduces net 
immigration of foreign citizens by about five thousand.16 The log GDP ratio, the gini 
coefficient ratio and the interaction between the ratios of log GDP and the gini coefficient 
are entered with a one period lag.17 The interaction term is introduced to allow the effect 
of inequality to depend on the income level of overseas countries relative to the UK, as 
mentioned above. The effect of the coefficient on the log GDP ratio is positive as 
expected and the coefficient implies that a ten percent increase in the ratio of UK to 
foreign income per capita increases immigration by 5.3 thousand. However, when the 
negative coefficient on the interaction term is taken into account (evaluating at the mean 
                                                          
16  These and other effects are calculated by multiplying the coefficient by the number of country 
groups in order to obtain the effects on total immigration.  
17  One reason for using lagged variables is that there may be simultaneity between immigration and 
income distribution, see for example Lerman (1999) for the United States and Barrett et. al. (2000) for 
Ireland. Although unemployment is not lagged the evidence produced by Dustmann et. al. (2003) suggests 
that, for the UK, immigration has almost no effect on unemployment.  
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of the gini coefficient ratio: 0.75) a ten percent increase in relative income increases 
immigration by only 1.7 thousand.  
 The gini coefficient ratio gives a positive sign that is not statistically significant 
while the interaction term is negative and significant. Using the point estimates, the 
overall effect of an increase in UK relative inequality is small and negative. The negative 
interaction term means that the effect of UK relative inequality gets smaller the poorer is 
the source region. The coefficients therefore imply positive selection from relatively 
developed countries.18 At the mean income ratio for the five developed regions, a ten 
percent increase in UK relative inequality would raise immigration by 3.6 thousand 
whereas for the eight less developed regions it would reduce immigration by 4.4 
thousand.19 This is what would be expected if rich source countries are relatively more 
equal than the UK while poor source countries are relatively less equal than the UK. But 
while the correlation between log relative income and the gini coefficient ratio is 
negative, it is not strong: across the 13 country/group means the correlation coefficient is 
-0.15. This is because some of the relatively poor countries, for example, in Asia, are 
relatively equal, while others in Africa and South America are relatively unequal. 
 The migrant stock has a large and statistically significant effect. The coefficient 
for net migration implies that every thousand of the immigrant stock generates a further 
126 immigrants each year. Clearly, this is the combined effect of lower costs of 
immigration faced by those with friends and relatives living in the UK and family 
reunification policy. It is notable, however, that the effects are much larger for gross 
immigration, suggesting that the migrant stock generates higher flows in both directions. 
                                                          
18  Borjas (1993) argued that the introduction in Canada, from the 1960s, of  policies that were more 
skill-selective than those in the United States led to a larger share of Canadian immigrants than of 
American immigrants coming from more developed regions. It seems that rising income inequality in 
Britain has gradually been producing a similar selection effect to that produced by policy in Canada.  
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The two dummies for Europe reflect the EU enlargements of 1986 and 1995, each 
with a one year lag. While the former takes a small coefficient the latter is surprisingly 
large, raising annual net immigration from Europe by nearly 19 thousand in 1996-2000. 
This may reflect an initial inward surge, since the increase in gross immigration from 
1987 was largely offset by a reverse flow. Nevertheless, the effects on gross immigration 
seem larger than would be expected from small enlargements and probably also reflect a 
general increase in intra-European mobility. Finally the dummy for 1998 to 2000 (which 
represents the loosening of UK immigration policy) has a strong positive effect. In these 
years the effect was to raise net immigration by 59 thousand per annum.  
 
7. Emigration of British citizens 
Random effects panel estimates for British citizens for the 25 years and 13 destinations 
appear in Table 6. Given that the left-hand side variable is for net emigration, the signs of 
the variables are expected to be the opposite of those in Table 5. These estimates explain 
41 percent of the variation in net emigration and more than half of the variation in gross 
emigration. As with the estimates for foreign citizens, random effects is not rejected 
against the alternative of fixed effects. Also as before, we focus on the estimates for net 
rather than gross emigration.  
 The coefficient on the change in UK unemployment is positive as expected. A one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate over the previous year increases net 
emigration by 8.2 thousand. The coefficients on the relative income and inequality terms 
offer further support for the model outlined above, and they have the opposite signs to 
those for the immigration of foreign citizens in Table 5. The coefficient on the log GDP 
ratio is about the same magnitude as that for foreign citizens in Table 5. But when the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19  The developed regions are taken to be Europe, the United States, Australia, Canada, and New 
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interaction term is taken into account, the effect of an increase in UK relative income, 
although negative, is very small.  
 It is interesting that relative inequality is much more powerful for British citizens 
than for foreign citizens. The gini coefficient ratio has an overall negative effect, which 
implies that a 10 percent rise in relative inequality reduces emigration by 18.2 thousand. 
The strong effect of inequality may be explained, at least in part, in terms of the 
framework set out above. If the migration cost facing prospective British emigrants (as 
represented by  µz + c in equation (3) is sufficiently large, then even high income 
destinations will look relatively unattractive. And if they are also relatively equal, then 
the effect of rising relative inequality at home will be negative for emigration. This would 
mean that the more skilled would be less likely to emigrate, so that total emigration 
would fall and emigrants would be less positively selected. The coefficients do indeed 
tend to support this interpretation. They imply that a ten percent rise in UK relative 
inequality would reduce net emigration to the five developed regions by 20.9 thousand 
and to the eight other regions by 8.6 thousand.  
 As with immigrants, the stock of UK-born living abroad is important, although it 
has no time series variation. The coefficient implies that each thousand of the British-
born living abroad generates net emigration of 107 British citizens per year--an effect 
similar in magnitude to that in Table 5 for the immigration of foreign citizens. 
Surprisingly though, the UK-born coefficient for gross emigration is smaller and not 
significant.  
 The dummies for country-specific policy changes give mixed results. Political 
change in South Africa has a strong negative effect. For Australia, the dummy for 1979-
2000 - intended to capture the effects of introducing the points system - is positive. This 
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probably reflects the increase in immigration targets in the later 1970s, after the sharp 
tightening in the mid-1970s. But the dummy for 1983 onwards, when points testing was 
significantly toughened, gives the expected negative coefficient. For Canada, the sharp 
cut in immigration targets for 1982-6 is strongly reflected in the data but a dummy 
representing further expansion from 1993 was insignificant. Similarly for the United 
States, the expansion of the quota from 1992 has no significant effect. But for New 
Zealand the 1991 reforms had a weak positive effect, contrary to what might have been 
expected.  
 The dummies for Europe from 1987 and 1996 tell a similar story to that for 
foreign citizens. From 1987 there was a large effect on gross emigration but only a small 
and insignificant increase on net emigration. By contrast, from 1996 both net and the 
gross emigration increased sharply. It remains to be seen whether this increase in 
emigration to Europe will be sustained in the longer term. 
 
8. Why has net immigration increased? 
The results for British and foreign citizens show that the same influences have operated 
with opposite signs on foreign immigration and British emigration. In order to measure 
their impact on net immigration as a whole, Table 7 provides estimates for total net 
immigration. The country dummies for policy shifts in South Africa, the United States, 
New Zealand and Europe from 1987, which are statistically insignificant in the first 
column, are excluded in the second column. The insignificance of the foreign-born 
population in the UK is somewhat surprising and it largely reflects an inverse correlation 
with the UK-born population overseas. It is also notable that the overall effect of the 
dummy for Europe 1996-2000 indicates that the net in-migration of foreign citizens 
dominates the net out-migration of British citizens. This more parsimonious specification 
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gives results that are broadly consistent with what would be expected from those for the 
two separate groups in Tables 5 and 6 above and do not require extensive comment. 
 The estimated coefficients in the second column in Table 7 are used to decompose 
the increase in aggregate immigration into the contributions of the different variables. 
Since the cross-sectional variation is highly influential in the random effects regression, it 
is important to see if these estimates can explain a major part of the variation over time in 
total net immigration. Two decompositions are presented in Table 8, based on applying 
the coefficients to the average values of the variables for five-year periods. Over the long 
term, 1976-80 to 1996-2000, the predictions account for more than 90 percent of the 
overall increase in net immigration of 113 thousand per annum. Similarly, for the decade 
1986-90 to 1996-2000 more than three quarters of the 69 thousand increase is explained.  
 Unemployment was rising in the late 1970s but falling in the late 1990s and this 
accounts for a rise of 13.4 thousand per annum in net immigration between these periods. 
The modest increase in British GDP per capita, relative to the country groups in the data, 
produced an increase of 2.7 thousand per annum in net immigration. It is striking that by 
far the major effect stems from the trends in inequality, which accounts for a rise of 36.6 
thousand-- about one third of the total increase. Over this period the UK gini coefficient 
rose by nearly eight percentage points (from 0.247 to 0.323) while the average foreign 
gini increased by just one percentage point. Thus the dramatic effect of inequality was 
entirely due to rising UK inequality rather than to falling inequality abroad.  
 Among the policy-related effects, the Europe dummy added more than 12 
thousand to the annual net inflow while those for other countries had smaller positive 
effects--largely due to South Africa. But the largest effect arises from the dummy 
representing UK immigration policy since 1998, which adds 33.8 thousand per annum to 
the net immigration over the period since 1996.  
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 For the shorter period since the late 1980s the unemployment effects are reversed. 
UK unemployment was falling faster in the late 1980s than it was in the late 1990s, so 
that its contribution to the change between periods is negative. The effect of rising 
relative income was to generate an extremely modest increase of 1.8 thousand. The 
effects of rising relative UK inequality, though smaller than over the longer run, still 
account for nearly 20 percent of the observed rise in total net immigration. Finally, the 
effects of the dummies for European and UK policy account for a two thirds of the 
increase in net immigration since the late 1980s.  
 
9. Conclusion  
 Five main conclusions follow from the results presented in the preceding sections. 
They are as follows: 
• A simple empirical migration model, including income distribution as well as factors 
such as relative income and unemployment, is supported by the data and gives results 
that accord closely with predictions of the theory. 
• The same model can account for both the inward flows of foreign citizens and the 
outward flow of British citizens, both gross and net, although the parameter values 
differ between the two groups.  
• While immigration policies at home and abroad undoubtedly condition the effects of 
economic variables, the effects of major shifts in policy can also be discerned. 
• The explanatory variables can predict most of the rise in UK immigration since the 
late 1970s and over the shorter period since the late 1980s. 
• Although income and unemployment variables contribute to this explanation, the key 
variables are rising inequality in the UK and the policy dummies for Britain and the 
EU.  
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How can we interpret these results? Relative inequality has the largest effects on the 
declining net emigration of British citizens. Immigration policies in several key 
destination countries became increasingly skill-selective from the 1970s. While this 
reduced the ability of the low skilled to emigrate, the increasing relative return to skills in 
Britain that is reflected in rising inequality reduced the incentive for the high skilled to 
emigrate. Thus the skill content of emigration did not rise any faster than the skill content 
of immigration but total net emigration declined.  
The policy effects are more difficult to interpret since these are represented by 
dummies. Growing integration and falling barriers to migration within the EU clearly 
have raised both the immigration of European citizens to Britain and emigration of British 
citizens to Europe. But the sharp increase in net immigration of foreign citizens in recent 
years has occurred across the board and this appears to be due to more permissive UK 
immigration policy.  
What of the future? Since unemployment is unlikely to keep falling, since relative 
income effects on immigration are small, and since the rise in inequality has largely 
ceased, it seems unlikely that these forces will cause a further substantial increase in net 
immigration. It seems more likely that future increases in net immigration will be largely 
the result of changing immigration policies. Given the large effects that the modest 
changes in the late 1990s had on the numbers, it seems likely that the more expansionary 
policies that became effective from 2003 will have an even larger effect.  
It is appropriate to conclude on a note of caution. This study is the first attempt to 
provide econometric estimates that account for cross-section and time series variation in 
UK net immigration. The findings presented here will no doubt be modified and refined 
by future research. But there are major limitations on what can be achieved with the 
limited data available and improvements in the published migration data are badly 
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needed. From a research perspective, further effort should also be made to characterise 
immigration policies and to examine the effects of policy not only on the number of 
immigrants but on the flow of human capital.  
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Table 1 
UK Net Immigration by Country of Origin or Destination 
(International Passenger Survey: Thousands per decade) 
 
 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 
Commonwealth     
Australia −189.8 −181.2  −43.4 
Canada −148.3   −47.7    −7.5 
New Zealand   −61.0     20.0    13.5 
South Africa   −67.3     −3.3 78.6 
Other African  Commonwealth       81.43     54.3 72.1 
Bangladesh, India,  Sri Lanka   108.4   109.5   106.5 
Pakistan      67.81     77.9     62.5 
Caribbean Commonwealth    −0.2       3.0       3.9 
Other Commonwealth     57.8       9.6     48.5 
Foreign    
European Union    −70.24       63.25    127.26 
Rest of Europe  −21.7       3.1     26.5 
United States   −45.0   −62.8   −19.9 
Rest of America       1.1       1.5     −2.5 
Other Foreign    −62.52     27.1   108.1 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, International Migration, (various issues). 
Notes:  (1) From 1973 only; (2) Includes Pakistan 1968-72; (3) West Indies only; (4) Coverage reflects 
enlargement in 1973; (5) Reflects enlargement in 1981 and 1986; (6) As constituted in 1995. 
 
 
Table 2 
Gross and Net Immigration Flows 
(International Passenger Survey: Thousands per decade) 
 
 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 
All Nationalities    
       Gross Immigration  1907.7 2185.4  2798.3 
       Gross Emigration  2255.5 2111.1  2223.2 
       Net Immigration  −347.8     74.3    575.1 
UK Citizens    
       Gross Immigration    828.1   975.9  1046.0 
       Gross Emigration  1558.3 1346.8  1257.6 
       Net Immigration  −730.2 −370.9  −211.6 
Foreign Citizens    
       Gross Immigration  1079.6 1209.5  1752.3 
       Gross Emigration    697.2   764.3    965.6 
       Net Immigration    382.4   445.2    786.7 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, International Migration (various issues). 
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Table 3 
Net Immigration by Age and Occupational Status 
(International Passenger Survey: Thousands per decade) 
 
 1971-80 1981-90 1991-2000 
Sex    
Male −216.1  −20.5   238.3 
Female −132.1    94.7   337.0 
Age    
<15   −82.0     27.8     58.1 
15-24     65.7   148.7   399.6 
25-44 −282.7   −53.5   121.1 
>45   −49.3   −48.7     −3.3 
Occupation (adults)    
Professional/Managerial −112.5      2.9   156.1 
Manual/Clerical         −274.0   −89.2     75.0 
Students   148.1   61.0   193.8 
Other Adults (unoccupied)   −30.0   54.6   100.7 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, International Migration, (various issues). 
Note: Other Adults are chiefly those labelled as ‘housewives’. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Intended Length of Stay among Immigrants and Emigrants 
(International Passenger Survey: percent of total) 
 
 1-2 years 3-4 years More than 4 
years 
Not sure 
Immigrants 35.6 18.3 39.4 6.7 
Emigrants 27.6 11.9 54.4 6.0 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, International Migration, (various issues). 
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Table 5 
Immigration of Foreign Citizens 
Random Effects Panel Estimates, 1976-2000 
 
       Net       Gross 
Constant 
 
      −1.83 
        (0.7) 
      −0.53 
        (0.1) 
Change in UK unemployment rate 
 
      −0.41 
        (2.4) 
      −0.37 
        (2.0) 
Log GDP per capita ratio 
      (UK to foreign, t-1) 
        4.07 
        (2.5) 
        2.48 
        (1.3) 
Gini coefficient ratio 
      (UK to foreign, t-1) 
        2.44 
        (0.9) 
        8.03 
        (2.7) 
Log GDP per capita ratio (t-1) × 
      Gini coefficient ratio (t-1) 
      −3.71 
        (2.0) 
      −5.85 
        (3.0) 
Foreign-born population in UK, 
       1981 
        9.68 
        (2.1) 
      24.68 
        (2.4) 
Europe 1987-98 
 
        3.23 
        (1.9) 
      14.94 
        (2.4) 
Europe 1996-8 
 
      18.83 
        (8.8) 
      29.73 
      (13.6) 
Dummy 1998-2000         4.54 
        (6.2) 
       5.62 
       (7.4) 
R2  Within         0.38         0.65 
      Between         0.58         0.69 
      Overall         0.46         0.68 
Breusch-Pagan χ2(1)     199.41   1464.19 
Hausman χ2(9)         3.61         0.44 
No. of observations      325     325 
   
 
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses 
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Table 6 
Emigration of UK Citizens 
Random Effects Panel Estimates, 1976-2000 
 
       Net       Gross 
Constant 
 
      12.11 
       (4.1) 
      17.23 
        (5.2) 
Change in UK unemployment rate 
 
        0.63 
        (2.9) 
        0.52 
        (2.7) 
Log GDP per capita ratio 
      (UK to foreign, t-1) 
      −4.47 
        (2.1) 
      −3.56 
        (1.6) 
Gini coefficient ratio 
      (UK to foreign, t-1) 
    −15.52 
        (4.3) 
      −9.25 
        (2.6) 
Log GDP per capita ratio (t-1) × 
      Gini coefficient ratio (t-1) 
        5.63 
        (2.3) 
        1.36 
        (0.6) 
UK-born population overseas, 
       1971 
        8.23 
        (2.5) 
        4.25 
        (0.9) 
South Africa 1991-2000 
 
      −4.78 
        (2.5) 
      −4.09 
        (2.2) 
Australia 1979-2000       13.59 
        (4.1) 
        9.16 
        (2.8) 
Australia 1983-2000 
 
      −8.65 
        (3.2) 
      −4.53 
        (1.8) 
Canada 1982-6 
 
      −6.12 
        (2.5) 
      −5.14 
        (2.2) 
USA 1992-2000 
 
        0.38 
        (0.2) 
        3.03 
        (1.6) 
New Zealand 1991-2000 
 
        1.63 
        (0.8) 
        2.08 
        (1.2) 
Europe 1987-2000 
 
        0.43 
        (0.2) 
      14.74 
        (7.2) 
Europe 1996-2000 
 
        8.99 
        (3.4) 
        6.88 
        (2.8) 
R2  Within         0.21         0.28 
      Between         0.67         0.60 
      Overall         0.41         0.52 
Breusch-Pagan χ2(1)       67.36     821.28 
Hausman χ2(13)         9.02         1.40 
No. of observations     325     325 
   
 
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses 
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Table 7 
Total Net Immigration (UK and foreign citizens) 
Random Effects Panel Estimates, 1976-2000 
 
       Net       Net 
Constant 
 
    −11.17 
        (3.6) 
    −11.63 
        (3.9) 
Change in UK unemployment rate 
 
      −0.92 
        (3.1) 
      −0.94 
        (3.2) 
Log GDP per capita ratio 
      (UK to foreign, t-1) 
        6.22 
        (2.7) 
        6.36 
        (2.8) 
Gini coefficient ratio 
      (UK to foreign, t-1) 
       15.74 
        (3.6) 
      17.62 
        (4.6) 
Log GDP per capita ratio × 
      Gini coefficient ratio 
      −5.23 
        (1.9) 
      −5.74 
        (2.4) 
UK-born population overseas, 
       1971 
      −9.91 
        (3.3) 
    −11.13 
        (4.6) 
Foreign-born population in UK, 
       1981 
        1.65 
        (0.4) 
         -- 
South Africa 1991-2000 
 
        5.12 
        (2.1) 
        5.10 
        (2.2) 
Australia 1979-2000     −12.69 
        (3.2) 
    −12.11 
        (3.1) 
Australia 1978-2000 
 
      12.62 
        (3.5) 
      12.38 
        (3.4) 
Canada 1982-6 
 
        6.19 
        (1.9) 
        6.38 
        (2.0) 
US 1992-2000         2.02 
        (0.8) 
         -- 
New Zealand 1991-2000       −1.49 
        (0.6) 
         -- 
Europe 1987-2000 
 
        2.95 
        (2.1) 
         -- 
Europe 1996-2000 
 
      11.55 
        (2.8) 
      12.04 
        (3.8) 
Dummy 1998-2000         4.52 
        (3.7) 
       4.33 
       (3.6) 
R2  Within         0.29         0.28 
      Between         0.93         0.93 
      Overall         0.53         0.53 
Breusch-Pagan χ2(1)         0.08         0.17 
Hausman χ2(10,8)       16.96       13.69 
No. of observations     325     325 
   
 
Note: ‘z’ statistics in parentheses 
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Table 8 
Effects on Total Net Immigration  
(thousands per annum) 
 
 1976-80 to  
1996-2000 
1986-90 to  
1996-2000 
Change in UK unemployment rate       13.4       −6.1 
Log GDP per capita ratio         2.6         0.6 
Gini coefficient ratio       36.6       13.1 
Europe dummy       12.0       12.0 
Other country dummies         5.4         4.1 
UK policy dummy       33.8       33.8 
Explained total     103.8       57.5 
Actual total     113.0       69.4 
   
 
 
Figure 1
Total Net Immigration, 1964-2000
( International Passenger Survey and Adjusted Total)
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Figure 2
Net Immigration of British and Foreign Citizens, 1964-2000
(International Passenger Survey)
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Figure 3
Skill Composition of Immigrants and Emigrants, 1969-2000
(Of those with Occupations; International Passenger Survey)
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